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Introduction
Po~ers of appointment play an important role in estate planning. The
proper use of powers can give great flexibility to an estate plan without
incurring any transfer tax whatsoever. Needless to say, the price of such
benefits is careful adherence 1to the requirements of the tax law. Fortunately, the rules in this area are among the clearest and best settled in
the transfer tax field. The problems that do arise often seem to result from
failure to understand the wide latitude the existing rules give the planner
in meeting a client's wishes. In other words, there is little or no need to
operate at the undefined fringe of the transfer tax system in using powers
of appointment in estate planning.
The following discussion of powers of appointment emphasizes what
can be done within the well-established rules. After an introduction to
the property law of powers and the accompanying terminology, I summarize the tax treatment of powers and introduce the difference between
"special" and "general" powers. The discussion then moves to considering these rules in the context of estate planning. First, I outline the ·
situations in which a taxable power may be useful. These are limited in
number but of great importance in accomplishing certain common estate
planning goals. Equally common goals should be accomplished through
the creation of nontaxable powers. The rest of the chapter, therefore,
deals with different methods of giving the object of a client's bounty access
to property transferred by the client without creating transfer tax consequences for the beneficiary.
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POWERS OF APPOINfMENf: DEFINITIONS AND
BASIC RULES
The power of appointment is first and foremost part of Anglo-American
property law. Its history is complex but its present role is as straightforward as it is important. It is, in broadest terms, a device for giving someone
a greater or lesser degree of control of the distribution of property in the
future, which control can then be exercised in the light of circumstances
then existing that cannot be foreseen _at the time the power is created.
The simplest example involves a trust created by A for the benefit of his
child 13 for life. At B's death the trust will terminate and be distributed
to such of B's children. in such proportions as B shall designate in B's
''will, and if B makes no designation, to B's children in equal shares. B's
ability to choose who will receive how much of the trust is a power of
appointment. A is the donor of the power and B the donee. B's children
are permissible objects of the power and they are also the takers in default
of B's exercising the power. Because B could only exercise the power by
will it is a testamentary power of appointment. Powers can also be exercised during life and are then described as inter vivos powers, or as
powers of appointment by deed, since they usually must be exercised by
a document executed with the formalities required for the transfer of real
property. Unless forbidden by the instrument creating the power, inter
vivos powers can also be exercised by will.
In estate planning terms, A is the client for whom the plan is created.
The tax status of the power, however, will affect B's transfer tax situation.
The creation of the power by A may involve transfer tax, of course. In
the example above, if the trust were created inter vivos A would have
made a completed transfer for gift tax purposes. If the trust were testamentary, the trust property would be taxed as part of A's estate. The
taxation of powers of appointment, however, involves taxation of the
donee, that is, of the person holding the power. In other words, in formulating an estate plan involving powers 'of appointment the planner must
keep in mind that the estate tax and gift tax effects of the powers, if any,
will be borne by someone other than the client for whom the plan is
created. The ramifications of the plan, therefore, are more widespread ·
than they would be otherwise and the careful planner may very well have
to broaden the search for information relevant to <"'the plan.
Not every power of appointment, however, results in taxation to the donee. The gift tax in Internal Revenue Code Section 2514 and the estate tax
in Section 2041 divide all powers ofappointment into two classes: general
powers of appointment and special powers of appointment. The distinction
between the two is simple to state. A general power is a power that is exercisable in favor of the donee, the do nee 's estate, the do nee 'screditors, or the
creditors of the donee's estate.' Special powers are all other powers.
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The listing of the four' objects of appointment that create a general
power has been construed to be disjunctive. The ability to appoint to any
one of the four will create a general power of appointment. 2 In addition,
the power to appoint property to satisfy taxes, debts, or other changes
enforceable against the donee's estate is a general power of appointment,
as is a power to appoint property to satisfy the donee's legal obligations,
such as those of support.3 Roughly put, the transfer tax system treats as
general powers those that allow the donee to use the property over which
the power is applicable as if it were the donee's own.
Any other power of appointment is a special power of appointment.
The Treasury Regulations specifically state that the special power may,
be worded in a broad or narrow manner. That is, the power may be one
to appoint to anyone other than the four entities that define a general
power of appointment, or one to appoint to specific persons or classes of
, persons none of which is the donee, the donee's estate, the donee's creditors, or the creditors of the donee's estate.4
'
Classifying a power as general or special determines the treatment of
the power for estate and gift tax purposes. Under 1.R.C. Section 2041 the
donee of a general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942,
is considered the owner of the appointive property. All property subject
to the power on the date 'of death is included in the donee's gross estate.5
All that is required is that the general power of appointment exist. The
donee's lack of capacity to exercise the power for reasons of minority or
incompetency is irrelevant. 6 Nor is it necessary that the general power of
appointment be exercisable by will. An inter vivos power that ends with
the donee's death is in existence at death and will lead to tax.7
Property subject to a general power of appointment created on or
before October 21, 1942,'is included in the donee's gross estate only to
the ex-tent of property as to which the general power of appointment is
exercised.8 This difference in treatment depending on the date of creation
of the power reflects the somewhat complicated history of estate tax
treatment of general powers of appointment. 9 The change in treatment
led to a transition rule for partial releases of general powers, which is
preserved in the statute."
While the number of "pre-1942 powers," as they are often called,
decreases with every passing year, it is still possible in the late 1980s to
encounter such relics of the old law. Because these pre-1942 powers result
in estate tax only if exercised, the estate planner must be aware of the
state law regarding exercise of general power of appointment. In a
minority of states a general residuary clause will exercise a general power
of appointment held by the testator by adding the appointive property to
the residue. The result would be, of course, the taxing of the appointive
property in the donee's estate. The problem can be avoided by adding to
the will an express refusal to exercise any power of appointment held.

a
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The addition of such boilerplate as a prophylactic measure should be
considered whenever a will is drafted.
The gift tax treatment of general powers is also based on the analogy
between holding a general power of appointment and outright ownership.
The inter vivas exercise of a general power of appointment no matter
when created is a transfer of the appointive property for gift tax purposes.
.The gift tax effect will depend on the extent to which the transfer is
complete, on the availability of exclusions and deductions and indeed on
every variable that enters into the analysis of any other transfer of property by a donor. For. a general power of appointment created on or before
October 21, 1942, the analysis ends here.11
A general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, need
...
. not be exercised, however, to cause gift tax consequences. The release
or lapse of such a power during the donee' s life will also result in a transfer
of property for gift tax purposes. The concept of release is a straightforward one. It requires some act by the donee that extinguishes the power.
By giving up the power to direct the property to himself, his estate, his
creditors, or the creditors of his estate, the donee of the power becomes
the transferor of the property subject to the power. Whether or not a gift
results depends on the application of the principles of the gift tax.
A lapse occurs when the donee does nothing and the power disappears
by its own terms. For example, a trust meeting the requirements ofl.R.C.
·section 2503(c) is a popular vehicle for making gifts to a minor. All additions to such a trust qualify for the present interest exclusion of Section
2503(b) up to the dollar limits of that section. The trust property must
pass to the beneficiary at age 21. Be_cause many donors feel that 21 is too
young an age at which to give a person outright ownership of substantial
property many of these trusts are drafted to give the minor beneficiary·
the right to terminate the trust and acquire the trust property during a
short period of time after attaining the age of 21 years. If the termination
right is not exercised the trust continues until the beneficiary reaches a
rpore mature age. The donor, of course, hopes· that the beneficiary can
be convinced of the wisdom of not exercising the termination right.
The right to end the trust and acquire the trust property, however, is
a right to appoint to oneself and is therefore a general power of appointment. If the beneficiary does not exercise the power it ends. This extinguishing by its own terms is a lapse of tfie powe;. For gift tax purposes
the beneficiary (who is the donee of the power) is the transferor of all the
trust property. In other words, the beneficiary is treated as the creator
of the trust. Whether or not there is a completed gift depends, of course,
· on the terms of the trust.
To summarize, a general power of appointment created after October
21, 1942, is the equivalent of outright ownership for purposes of the gift
tax. A release or a lapse of such a power is a transfer. If the property
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over which the power applies is in trust, the release or lapse is the equivalent of the donee of the power taking the property out of the trust and
then putting it back in. The release or lapse does .not change the terms
of the original disposition of the property by the donor of the general
power of appointment; it simply makes the donee the author of those
terms.
A donee can get rid of an unwanted general power of appointment
without triggering the consequences of a lapse or release. It is possible
to make a qualified disclaimer of the power under Section 2518.12 The
requirements of that section must be met of course, and state law must
allow the disclaimer of a general power of appointment. It is possible that
the enactment of Section 2514(c)(3) applicable to disclaimers made after
'December 31, 1981, allows the disclaimer of a general power of appointment effective for federal transfer tax purposes regardless of the provi, sions of state law, but the point is unclear and probably will remain so
until regulations are issued under this subsection.
If estate tax results from the inclusion of property subject to a general
power of appointment held by the decedent, the code provides a special
rule placing liability for the tax on the recipient of the property (whether
an appointee or a taker in default) in Section 2207. That section allows
the decedent's estate to recover from the recipient "such portion of the
total tax paid as the value of such property bears to the taxable estate."
The appointive property, therefore, is assumed to pay estate tax at the
average rate to which the estate is subject. If the taxable estate absent
the appointive property is small, perhaps so small that tax would be totally
offset by the unified credit, it is possible that all the tax due is caused by
the operation of Section 2041. If the estate beneficiaries and the recipients
of the appointive property are different persons, Section 2207 will in effect
cause the former to bear some of the estate tax liability caused by property
going solely to the latter. This problem is easily eliminated, at least in
testate estates. The rule of Section 2207 operates "[ujnless the decedent
directs otherwise in his will" and therefore can be overriden by a tax
apportionment clause. Such a clause could easily direct that the appointive
property bear the increase in estate tax caused by its inclusion in the
gross estate under Section 2041. The choice ofan appropriate tax apportionment clause is an important part of estate planning subject to many
considerations. It is important to realize, however, that the code provides
a rule with regard to tax caused under Section 2041 that may not be to
every client's liking but will operate unless steps are taken to avoid it.,
Special powers of appointment have no estate or gift tax effect whatsoever. One may die possessed of a special power, exercise one during
life, or allow it to lapse, or release it, and there will be no need to be
concerned with estate or gift tax, except perhaps in one limited situation.
The government has maintained that the exercise of a special power of
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appointment that has the effect of extinguishing another interest of the
donee of the power in the appointive property that could itself be disposed
of without reference to the special power results in a gift of that interest.13
One situation, which has actually been litigated, involved an income beneficiary of a trust who was also the donee of a special power of appointment by deed over the corpus of the trust. The exercise of the special
power by appointing all the trust property to permitted appointees would
be a gift under Section 2511 of the value of the income interest if the
analysis above is correct. In Self v. United States the Court of Claims
disagreed with the government's position and found that· the income interest was terminated rather than transferred. 14 The Internal Revenue
Service declared it would not follow Self" and finally prevailed on the
same issue in the Tax Court in Estate of Regester. '6 The Tax Court specifically stated that it would not follow Self, and for now the matter is in
that limbo of conflicting authority from which clients should be preserved.17

ESTATE PLANNING WITH POWERS OF
APPOINTMENT
The Usesof General Powers
It. should be obvious from the foregoing discussion that the deliberate

creation of a taxable or nontaxable power of appointment is a fairly simple
matter. Assuming for the moment what will be discussed at length below,
that is, that there are many different ways to inadvertently create a general
power of appointment, why would any planner deliberately advise that a
client give a donee the power to appoint to the donee, the donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the creditors of the donee 's estate? There are
three specific planning goals that supply the answer to that question.
The first, and perhaps the most important, is the desire to create a
Section 2056(b)(5) or Section 2523(e) general power of appointment marital
deduction trust. No marital deduction is allowed for estate or gift tax
c'purposes for the transfer of a terminable interest to a spouse. The definition of that term includes a life income interest in a trust the remainder
of which is given to someone other than the spouse or the spouse's estate.
If, however, the income interest is of ~ certain sort, defined by statute
and regulation, and if the spouse has a general power of appointment over
the trust, the propertytransferred
to the trust Will qualify for the marital
deduction.18
The requisite power of appointment is not quite the same as the
general power of appointment defined in Sections 2041 and 2514. First,
the power must be "exercisable in favor of such ... spouse, or of the
estate of such ... spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each
case the power is exercisable in favor of others."19 This marital deduction
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general power of appointment, therefore, is a sort of subset of all general
powers of appointment. Of the four objects of appointment that define a
general'power of'appointrnent, only two, the donee and the donee's estate,
will create a.general power of appointment that satisfies the requirements
of the marital deduction. In addition, both the estate tax and the gift tax
sections require that the power be "exercisable by such spouse alone and
in all events." The careful drafter will include precisely those words in
the actual power. In fact, the terms of the power of appointment necessary
to obtain the marital deduction are all set out in the statute and the careful
planner will not depart from them." There is, however, no problem with
the creator of the power specifying takers in default who will receive the
trust property should the spouse not exercise the power.
Some formal limitations on the exercise of the power are 'allowed.
For instance, the spouse can be required to make specific reference to
. the power in the spouse's will or to exercise the power only in a will
executed after the death of the first spouse to die. Powers exercisable
during life can be required to be exercised in a particular form and the
spouse can be required to give notice to the trustee of exercise. 21 Anything
more, however, will ruin the estate plan. Clearly, innovation is not at a
premium here.
l
The properly drafted power will, of course, require the inclusion of
the trust property in the spouse's estate if the spouse dies possessed of
the power, or it will result in gift tax if the spouse uses an inter vivos
power to transfer trust property or releases the power· or allows it to
lapse. This result is an integral· part of the rationale of the marital deduction: what is deducted in the estate of the spouse first to die is taxed in
the estate of the spouse second to die (to the extent it has not been
consumed during life) or as the surviving spouse makes gifts of the property. Since ultimate taxability is the goal, the deduction may be secured
by either a testamentary or an inter vivos power. If only the former is
given, the spouse can make no inter vivos transfer of the property and
since no one may hold a power to transfer property to anyone other than
the spouse taxability is assured. If only an inter vivos power is given,
Section 2041 will still tax any property left in the trust at the spouse's
death because the decedent did indeed possess the power at death.
The choice of the Section 2056(b)(5) trust as thd vehicle for obtaining
the marital deduction must depend, of course, on the needs, desires, and
circumstances of each client. One possible advantage of this sort of arrangement involves the general power of appointment itself. A person
who receives property either through the exercise or the lapse of a general
power of appointment may disclaim the property within nine months of
the exercise or lapse of the power.22 In the typical marital deduction
situation this ability to disclaim within nine months of the death of the
second spouse to die may be of advantage. Assume that the surviving
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spouse is the beneficiary of a Section 2056(b)(5) trust. The takers in default
of the spouse's exercise of the general power of appointment are the
descendents then living of the couple with the distribution to be made per
stirpes. If at the death of the spouse beneficiary the children of the marriage are living they will take the trust property in absence of an appointment. If those children are of mature age they may desire to pass the
trust property directly to their children in preference' to swelling their
own estates. Since they have nine months after their parent's death to
disclaim the trust property, they can make that decision at the last minute.
If the marital deduction property were held in a testamentary qualified
terminable interest property (QTIP) trust the contingent remainders in
that trust- would have to be disclaimed, if at all, within nine months of
the death of the spouse whose will created the trust. 23
The second situation in which a general power of appointment may
be deliberately created involves the new generation-skipping transfer tax
enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The new tax is
levied at the highest estate tax rate.24 It does not apply, however, to
transfers otherwise subject to estate or gift taxation with respect to a
person one generation below the transferor. 25 If a member of that generation is given a general power of appointment in order to "force" taxation of property in his or her estate, there will be less tax paid than if
the generation-skipping transfer tax were to apply, so long as that person's
marginal estate tax bracket is less than the maximum rate. For example,
parent sets up a trust with child as life income beneficiary, remainder to
grandchildren. The child has an "interest"> the termination of which will
be a taxable event. 27 The trust corpus will at that time be subject to tax
at the prevailing maximum estate tax rate. If, however, the child holds a
general power of appointment over the trust, the trust property will be
included in child's gross estate and will not be subject to the generationskipping transfer tax. If the child's marginal estate tax rate is less than
the maximum rate, there will be a tax saving through the general power
of appointment. 28
,'
Finally, the inter vivos general power of appointment may be useful
in circumventing certain problems raised by the rule against perpetuities.
Generally speaking, the, perpetuities period starts anew for dispositions
made through exercise of an inter vivos general power of appointment
but relates back to the time of the creation of the power when a disposition
is made by exercise of a special power of appointment or of a testamentary
general power. AIJ inter vivos general power, therefore, may be useful if
the donor wishes to give the donee the alternative of appointing the property in further trust for a period that would violate the rule against perpetuities as measured from the time of the creation of the power.
This relationship between the rule against perpetuities and powers of
appointment has had one effect on Section 2041. In some states the per-
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petuities period runs from the exercise of a testamentary power, be it
special or general. Under such a statute it is possible to create a perpetual
private trust through the creation of a series of life estates with special
'testamentary powers of appointment over the remainder. The trust property would thus forever escape transfer taxation. In order to prevent this
result, Section 2041(a)(3) provides that assets subject to a special power
of appointment are included in the gross estate of the donee of a special
power of appointment if the donee exercises the power "by creating
another power of appointment which under the applicable local law can
be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any estate or interest
in such property ... for a period ascertainable without regard to the date
of the creation of the first power." In other words, the price of starting
the perpetuities period anew is taxation. In addition, it is important to
realize that the statutory language goes beyond simply closing the loophole c
created in a few states. If a special power is exercised so as to create an
inter vivos general power the statutory requirement quoted above will be
fulfilled: the special power will have been exercised to create a power
from the exercise of which the perpetuities period will begin .to run anew.
Every donee of a special power must be aware ~f this trap.

The Unintentional Creation of General Powers in Pursuit of
Planning Goals
If the rules for the creation of a general power of appointment are as straightforward as they have been described and if the situations in which they are
useful are as limited as they appear to be, the reader may be justified in wondering why the fuss. Unfortunately, a closer examination of the rules surrounding the taxation of powers of appointment is fully justified. It is possible
to create a general power of appointment in many ways besides giving a
donee the power to appoint to one or more of the magic quartet. The resulting unintentional creation of a general power of appointment is often the
byproduct of the attempt to meet one or more common planning goals. Fortunately, these goals can generally be accomplished well within the limits
of Section 2041. The remainder of this chapter first describes the major pitfalls and then attempts to set out some straightforward ways of working
within Section 2041 and thus avoiding taxation.
Even though the donee may not have the power to appoint to one of
the four entities that figure in the definition of a general power of appointment, the power cannot be properly classified unless the takers In
default are considered. If the takers in default of exercise of the power
include one or more of the definitional quartet, the power is a general
power. The theory behind this result is quite simple. By not exercising
the power the donee can in effect appoint to the takers in default. In this
context, not to choose is to choose.29
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Clearly, takers in default have to be chosen with care. Usually, the
takers in default are objects of the bounty of the donorof the power of
appointment. The power itself is created to provide flexibility. The donor
probably assumes that in the absence of special circumstances the power
will. not be exercised and the appointive property will be distributed to
the takers in default. If this situation is indeed the usual one surrounding
the creation of a power of appointment, the inadvertent creation of a
general power should seldom occur; the takers in default would always
be persons (or perhaps a charitable entity) other than the donee, the
donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the creditors of the donee's
es fate.
One situation related to the possibility of the identity of the takers in
default creating a general power of appointment has been litigated. The
question involves the status of insurance settlement options selected by
the insured that provide for an annuity to the beneficiary followed by
distribution of the principal to the executor of the beneficiary's estate.
The Seventh Circuit has held that the principal was not includable in the
deceased beneficiary's estate.> The Fifth Circuit, however, construed a
similar provision to be a general power of appointment on the theory that
the-payment to the decedent's estate subjected the fund to her unfettered
control.31 While the technical basis for the Fifth Circuit's holding may be
questioned, it does emphasize the need to consider the destination of
property in the absence of an "appointment" by the decedent.
A far more common situation in which a general power of appointment
may be inadvertently created exists whenever a beneficiary has power to
appropriate trust property to himself or herself. The Treasury Regulations
make clear that such a power is a general power of appointment: "[I]f a
trust instrument provides that the beneficiary may appropriate or consume
the principal of the trust, the power to consume or appropriate is a power
of appointment."32 Similarly, a power in a beneficiary "to affect the beneficial enjoyment of trust property or its income by altering, amending,
,. or revoking the trust instrument or terminating the trust is a power of
· appointment" that may be general-if the beneficiary can benefit from the
exercise of the power.33
It must also be realized that the provisions of the Regulation quoted
above do not apply only to trusts. Any, similar arrangement will also fall
within the ambit of Section 2041. Perhaps the most common, and the most
troublesome, is the legal life estate coupled with a power to consume.
Depending on the local law oflife estates and waste, the power to consume
may be a general power of appointment." The extent of the life tenant's
rights and responsibilities, of course, is set by state law. In the absence
of specific language in the instrument creating the legal -life estate the exact nature of those rights and responsibilities may be unclear. Litigation
over the matter in the federal courts may require those courts to interpret
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state law in the absence of definitive holdings of the highest court of the
state.35
A similar situation arises when a beneficiary is also trustee and as
trustee has,the power to appoint trust property to himself or herself. Such
a power may be a general power of appointment depending on the terms
governing the decision to make the self-benefiting payment. Suffice it to
say for now, an unlimited discretionary power to make payments to oneself, even if it is exercised in a fiduciary capacity, is a general power of
appointment. So common is the inadvertent creation of a general power
of appointmentin a trustee beneficiary that some states, most prominently
New York, prohibit a trustee beneficiary from participating in decisions
to benefit himself or herself.36 At least one federal district court has found
that state case law created a similar prohibition. In Garfield v. United
States37 the court held that Massachusetts case law established the principle that in cases of "ambiguity" a trustee beneficiary did not have the
power to decide to make payments to himself. Such savings provisions,
of course, will vary from state to state, but they would seem to be frail
reeds on which to rest an estate plan. In addition, a statute like that in
New York in effect requires that a discretionary trust have at least one
1
trustee who is not a beneficiary.
'
It should be noted here that an independent trustee may have the
broadest discretion to pay property to a beneficiary for any reason without
the beneficiary having a general power of appointment. So long as the
beneficiary can only compel the trustee to honestly exercise discretion
the beneficiary has no taxable power over the trust. 38
I

Giving the Beneficiary Access to the Trust: Exceptions-the
General Rule of Section 2041
The foregoing discussion of the ways in which a general power of appointment can be inadvertently created outlines the dangers to be avoided
in creating an estate plan involving trusts or trust-like arrangements in
which beneficiaries are to have rights of access.39 Such plans probably
are quite common. While the advantages of trusts are many, especially
when one is concerned for the continuity of management of assets that
are to benefit the elderly or infirm, many clients probably feel that so long
as beneficiaries are competent they should not have to go begging to an
indifferent trustee in order to obtain access to trust property beyond what
is required to be paid them on a-regular basis.
,
In addition, it would seem to be becoming more and more difficult,
especially in large metropolitan areas, to find professional management
of smaller trusts. In many situations, the beneficiary may be the most
available and trusted fiduciary. For example, the creator of a family spray
trust funded with the unified credit share of a relatively small estate may
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very well feel that the surviving spouse and one or more of their children
should be the persons charged with apportioning income and principal
among a group of people including themselves. Even if professional fiduciary services are available, the cost may be prohibitive unless the trust
is invested in common trust funds or other collective investment vehicles.
If the client prefers individualized investment advice there 'may be few
alternatives to the trustee beneficiary.
Given these assumptions the quest for ways to protect beneficiaries
from possession of a general power of appointment assumes great importance. Fortunately, there are three basic techniques for accomplishing
that end, each one based on a statutory exception to the definition of a
general power of appointment contained in Section 2041(b)(l). The first
involves powers subject to an "ascertainable standard" defined in Section
2041(b)(l)(A), the second involves the so-called five and five power found
in Section 2041(b)(2), and the third, joint powers dealt with in Section
2041 (b)(l)(C).
The first and most important of these exceptions removes from the
definition of general power of appointment any "power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the benefit of the decedent which is
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education,
support, or maintenance of the decedent.t'< The theory behind this exception is a most sensible one. So Jong as the do nee' s ability to appropriate
property is limited by a standard the exceeding of which would subject
the donee to an action by others interested in the property and result in
restoration of the wrongly appropriated property, the donee does not have
that unfettered command over the property which is, for transfer tax
purposes, the essence of the general power of appointment.41 In other
words, a beneficiary can be given access to trust property governed by
an ascertainable standard or as trustee can be given power to pay property
to himself or herself subject to an ascertainable standard and there will
be no transfer tax consequences arising from the possession of the power.
,•
The easiest way to create an ascertainable standard is to follow precisely the language of the statute and regulations. Section 20.2041-l(c)(2)
of Treasury Regulations states that "the extent of the holder's duty to
exercise and not to exercise the power" is governed by an ascertainable
standard if it is "reasonably measurable in terms of his needs for health,
education, or support (or any combination of them.)" The regulation goes
on to state that as far, as the Treasury is concerned support and maintenance "are synonymous and their meaning is not limited to the bare
necessities of life." As an added bonus the regulation also gives examples
of powers "limited by the requisite standard":
"support," "support in reasonable comfort," "maintenance in health and
reasonable comfort," "support in his accustomed manner of living," "edu-
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cation, including college and professional education," "health," and "medical, dental, hospital and nursing expenses and expenses of invalidism."

Finally, the regulation warns the planner what standards not to use: "A
power to use property for the comfort, welfare, or happiness of the holder
of the power is not limited by the requisite standard."
Given the detail of this Treasury Regulation Section 20.2041-l(c)(2),
the drafting of ascertainable standards should be an easy task. Assuming
that the language approved by the regulation will allow accomplishing the
client's desires within the context of local law governing trust administration, it is difficult to imagine what more could be desired. The approved
language clearly allows payments to continue an accustomed standard of
living that should, within the limits of local law, if any, allow increased
distributions to take account of inflation. The language related to health
should allow payments for the treatment of medical problems, even catastrophic illnesses. If the beneficiary is a young person, the approved
language allows payments for education through the most advanced graduate levels. Finally, the regulation specifically states that "it is immaterial
whether the beneficiary is required to exhaust his other income before
the power can be exercised."
1
In short, before the estate planner departs from the approved language
of Treasury Regulation Section 20.2041-l(c)(2) in drafting a standard to
govern a beneficiary's access to trust property the planner should be sure
.that the client's desires can be met in no other way. Given the volume of
litigation and administrative rulings, the Internal Revenue Service appears
disposed to challenge any standard that departs from the approved language of the regulation. I~ addition, these challenges take a very narrow
and technical view of what sort of language is equal to the approved
language of the regulation.
Perhaps the most striking example of the IRS's approach is Revenue
Ruling 77-60.42 The facts of that ruling involved a decedent who had been
given under the will of a predeceased spouse a life estate in certain properties wifh power to invade corpus as desired "to continue the donee's
accustomed standard ofliving." The ruling holds that the quoted language
does not create an ascertainable standard because under that language
payments could be made for expenditures going beyond the beneficiary's
"needs for health, education or support." Taxability in this instance seems
to turn on the single word "continue." If the standard of invasion had
been phrased in terms of "support in the donee's accustomed manner of
living" there would be perfect harmony with the statutory standard. ·Of course, as noted above, the exact meaning of any standard used
in a trust instrument, or in the creation of a legal life estate depends on
local law. Presumably, if it could be shown that the approved language of
the regulation a_ctually created under local law a standard .that was not
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related to the beneficiary's needs for health, education, support, or maintenance the beneficiary would indeed possess a general power of appointment. 43 As a practical matter, however, the IRS would probably not be
inclined to challenge any standard that conformed to the approved language of the regulation. Challenges are raised over "creative" drafting,
with the IRS attempting to show that the standard does not relate to the
statutory quartet and the taxpayer attempting to show that under local
law the standard is "ascertainable" and related.to the four magic words.
Such inquiries are complicated by the frequent lack of precedent from
jhe highest state court and the consequent need for the federal court to
make a decision about what the state law is.
This is not to say that taxpayers always lose. Brantingham v. United
States" involved the estate of a decedent who had been given a life estate
in her late husband's residuary estate along with "the uncontrolled right,
power and authority to use and devote such of the corpus thereof from
time to time as in her judgment is necessary for her maintenance, comfort
and happiness.":" In spite of the use of the word "happiness," which is
specifically condemned by Treasury Regulation Section 20.2041-l(c)(2),
the court found that this standard was indeed an ascertainable one within
the meaning of Section 2041(b)(l)(A). The court's holding is based on its
reading of Massachusetts law, which governed the trust. In Dana v. Gring46
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that a power to distribute
principal for "happiness" of the beneficiary was governed by an objective,
ascertainable standard because a reading of the dispositive instrument as
a whole indicated that the creator of the trust intended to preserve its
principal for eventual distribution to the remaindermen.
The IRS has indicated its nonacquiescence in Brantingham on the
rather strange ground that Dana v. Gring is inapplicable to the later case
because the powerholder in Brantingham was not a fidcuiary as was the
powerholder in Dana:" Presumably, the frank disapproval of the word
"happiness" in the regulation was not seen as sufficient ground for disapproving the Seventh Circuit's Brantingham decision. Of course, the
IRS may be unwilling to raise thefederalism issue inherent in not following
the highest court of a state on a matter 'of local property law. Whatever
the reasons, however, pursuing an action to the highest level in order to
establish the existence of an ascertainable standard is a stiff price to pay
for correcting a problem that may very well have been avoided by careful
drafting.
Brantingham involved the word "happiness." Another troubled word
in this area is "emergency." The fondness of draftspeople for the word is
understandable. Many, perhaps most, clients feel sure that whatever happens a beneficiary should have access to a trust if an emergency arises.
After all, what is the use of having a pool of capital preserved for a beneficiary's needs if it cannot be drawn on when it is really needed? The IRS,

POWERS

OF APPOINTMENT

/

363

however, maintains that emergencies can be related to matters other than
health, education, support, or maintenance and therefore a standard of invasion or encroachment to meet "emergencies" does not satisfy Section
2041(b)(l)(A). The Tax Court accepted this argument in its decision in Estate of Sowell.48 On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit disagreed.49 The
appellate court found that under the law of New Mexico that governed the
trust the word "emergency" would be construed as limited to situations
involving the sanctioned quartet of Section 2041(b)(l)(A).
The Tenth Circuit's opinion is not a model of clarity. It rests heavily
on dictionary definitions and much of the reasoning seems to be conclusory. The opinion, however, was cited with approval by a district court
in Hunter v. United States» in support of a holding that the term emergency is always "measurable in terms of health or to support a beneficiary's standard of living."51
Whether or not these cases portend the eventual acceptance of the
term emergency as an ascertainable standard it is probable that the road
to acceptance will not be smooth. The careful estate planner should seriously consider whether the term emergency really adds anything to a
standard of invasion. After all, the Hunter court approved the term by
reasoning that it really was synonymous with beneficiary's health or
support needs. If that is the case, why raise the problems sure to come
from the use of a questionable term. Unless local law makes it clear that
, the approved language of Regulation Section 20.2041-1( c )(2) will not allow
exercise of the power in an emergency there would seem to be no need
to engage in creative drafting.
The questions accompanying the use of the ascertainable standard
exception to the definition of a general power of appointment may discourage its use. In addition, it does not provide absolutely unfettered
access to trust property by a beneficiary. Unfettered access is possible,
however, without the consequences of possession of a general power of
appointment so long as the beneficiary is subject to limitations on the
amount of property that can be obtained. The so-called five and five power
of Section 2041 (b )(2) ,is an exception to the general rule that regards the
lapse of a general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942,
as an exercise. The statute provides that a taxable la se occurs only '.:19
the extent that the property, w 1ch could have been appointed by exercise
of such lapsed powers exceeded in value, at the time of such lapse" the
greater of $,5,000 or 5 percent "of the aggregate value, at the time of such
lapse, of the assets out of which ... the exercise of the lapsed powers
could have been satisfied."
,
To phrase this in a more positive way, a rower in a beneficiary: to
withdraw annually the reater of $5,000 or 5 percent of the value of the
corpus of a trust will have no transfer tax consequences. f the power
is not exercise"d in any year the lapse will be shelf ed by Section
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2041(b)(2). Similarly, a power to withdraw income is sheltered to the
extent of the greater of $5,000 or 5 percent of the income. The withdrawal can be for any purpose whatsoever and requires no justification
on the beneficiary's part.
The only trap in this arrangement involves the beneficiary's death
before the power has lapsed for the year. If the withdrawal can be made
at any time, the beneficiary will die possessing a general power of appointment. Death while possessed of a power .is not a lapse. The gross
estate will include the property that could have been withdrawn. Exposure
to taxation in this way can be greatly reduced if the time period for exercise
of the power is limited. For example, if the power is limited to exercise
during the last two weeks of the month of December, the property that
could have been withdrawn will be included in the beneficiary's gross
estate only if death occurs during those two weeks.52 Presumably, the
period of exercise should be coordinated with an annual valuation of the
trust so that the 5 percent figure is easily ascertained.
The consequences of a lapse over an amount greater than that sheltered by the five and five rule are the same as that, of any lapse.53 The
powerholder is considered to be the transferor of the property over which
the power has lapsed. Depending on the terms of the trust there may or
may not be transfer tax consequences. If the income beneficiary of a trust
the remainder of which belongs to someone else has a one time power to
withdraw $10,000 in one year from corpus, the lapse of that power in a
year in which the corpus is worth $100,000 will result in a transfer of
$5,000 to the trust [$10,000 - (5% of $100,000)]. There will be a gift of
the actuarial value of the remainder interest in the trust; the beneficiary
has retained the income interest in the $5,000. In addition, the beneficiary
is now the transferor of 5 percent of the entire value of the trust (of the
$10p,ooo in the trustthe beneficiary is the transferor of $5,000 by virtue
of the lapse). Assuming that there are no further withdrawal powers, when
the beneficiary dies 5 percent of the value of the trust at that time will be
included in his or her gross estate under Section 2036(a)(l). The beneficiary has transferred $5,000 to a trust in which he or she has an income
interest, a transaction which fits Section 2036 precisely.
~ If the withdrawal power is annual and noncumulative, successive
lapses will increase the proportion of the corpus. which the beneficiary
has transferred. In the example .in 'the previous paragraph, if the power
to withdraw $10,000 can be exercised every y.ear, .and assuming that the
corpus of the trust always is valued at $100,000 each year, the beneficiary
will transfer $5,000, make a gift of the remainder interest in that amount
and become the transferor .of 5 percent of the trust corpus. If the beneficiary dies in the fifth year, his or her taxable estate willinclude first, the
$10,000 that could have been withdrawn in that year, since that is a general
power of appointment subject to Section 204~ and, second, 20 percent of
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the corpus of the trust under Section 2036(a)(l).54 Each year the beneficiary transferred 5 percent of the corpus; after four years the beneficiary
has become the transferor of 20 percent of the corpus. Of course, these
calculations become more. complex as the value of the trust changes. In
any event, if the lapse of the withdrawal power is not fully sheltered by
Section 204l(b)(2) the transfer tax consequences can become quite serious.
Perhaps the most common use of the five and five power is in connection with the creation of a so-called Crummey power. The name comes
from Crummey v. Commissioner, 55 which stands for the proposition that
um to a trust, which would otherwise be at least in part a gift of a future
interest, can be transformed into a gift of a present interest, $10,000· of
Wiiicli' is excluded from taxable gifts by Section 2503(b), to the extent that
a beneficiary can demand the distribution to himself of the _aift. S~
demand power is a general power of appointment the lapse of which will
have tax consequences to the extent it exceeds the limits of the five and
five power.
•
Crummey powers are often used in inter vivos life insurance trusts
!o provide a present interest exclusion for amounts contributed directly
or indirectly to the trust for the payment of premiums, Of course the technique can be used with any trust in order to allow funding of the trust
over a period of time without incurring gift tax. One consideration, however, is always present when drafting a Crummey power. If the power to
, withdraw can be satisfied only from the addition to the trust the 5 percent
limit of Section 204l(b)(2) is applied to the amount of the addition. If,
however, the withdrawal power may be satisfied from the entire corpus
of the trust the 5 percent limit is applied to that entire amount. For examp];, if the Crummey power is phrased so that the beneficiarymay
withdraw from the trust any additions made fo a given year, $10,000 of
additions will result in a $5,000 taxable lapse-$5,000 is greater than 5
percent ($500) of the property from which the withdrawal can be satisfied.
The result of the lapse will depend on the rules for taxation of a general
power outlined above. If the withdrawal power is phrased to allow the
withdrawal from the entire trust of an amount equal to the year's additions,
a $10,000 addition will result in a taxable lapse only if the trust's total
value is less than $,100,000.
The increase in the present interest exclusion to $10,000 effective
January l, 1982, has led to attempts to obtain the fullest possible exclusion
without exceeding the protection from lapse of Section 2041 (b )(2). Perhaps
the most ingenious approach is the "hanging power."56 This variation is
drafted to allow in any one year the lapse of a withdrawal power only to
the extent it is sheltered by the five and five rule. Any power to withdraw
more than the sheltered amount continues until the next year when the
power again lapses only to the extent it is sheltered by Section_204l(b)(2).
This pattern continues until the withdrawal powers have completely ended.
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Of course, this technique is useful only where additions to the trust will
continue for a fixed number of years and where the life expectancies of
the holder or holders of the Crummey powers are long enough to allow
the planner to be reasonably sure that all the powers will totally lapse
before death or termination of the trust. If a powerholder dies while
possessing unlapsed powers, Section 2041 will include the property that
could be withdrawn at death in the gross estate.57
The mechanics. of the Crummey power are fairly well established,
The beneficiary. must have notice of the existence of the power and a
reasonable time in which to exercise it.58 Minors may hold withdrawal
. powers with
the attendant benefits so long as. there is no impediment
under local law to the appointment of a guardian who could exercise the
_rights on their behalf." In fact, the Crummey power has becomea most
powerful tool, ·
..
.
_.
. Recently, however, there are indications that the !RS is beginning to
attemptto restrict the benefits of this device. In Revenue Ruling. 85-88 the
IR.S dealt with multiple withdrawal powers held by a single beneficiary in
multiple identical trusts created by the same grantor. The IRS ruled that the
lapses of the withdrawal powers in the identical trusts must be.agg(egated:
In other words, only one $5,000 amount was available to shelter the lapse.
The 5 percent limit is applied to the aggregate amount of property from which
the withdrawal could be satisifed. If the trusts are small, 5 percent of the
aggregate amount may be less than $5,000 and any lapse greater than that
amount will not be sheltered. This ruling leaves open thequestion. ~f aggregation where dissimilar trusts created by different grantors are involved.
Should the instant holding be extended questions will arise involving proration of the single available five and five shelter.
'
. The second significant recent ruling, Revenue Ruling 85~24,, involved
the creation of trusts with Crummey powers by each -of three members
ofa partnership. Each trust gave to the graritorschild a withdrawal power
and also gave similar powers to each of the other two partners. The IRS
( invoked the reciprocal trust doctrine of Estate of Grace= to deny a present
interest exclusion based on the powers held by the partners. Clearly, the
creation of reciprocal withdrawal powers is to be avoided.
Finally, a word must be given to the income tax consequences of the
withdrawal power. This aspect of the .. Crummey power has not received
much attention.6' In a recent private letter ruling, however, the IRS took
a position that could lead to severe income tax consequences for holders
of withdrawal powers.62 The ruling holds that the powerholder is taxable
on the income generated by the property that could be withdrawn during
the period in which the power may be exercised. This result is in full accord
with Section 678(a)(l). Since the withdrawal is usually exercisable only for
a short period, the tax consequences of this portion of the ruling need not
be significant. The ruling goes on, however, to assert that the powerholder
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will remain taxable on all the income generated by the portion of the trust
over which the withdrawal power has lapsed. The IRS reaches this conclusion by finding that the lapse is a release for purposes of Section 678(a)(2).
Should this proposition become well established the use of Crummey powers will become far more difficult. The problems are only magnified by the
"kiddie tax" provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 since many
powerholders are minors.
The final method of preventing a power to appropriate from being
treated as a general power of appointment involves joint powers. First,
if a power created on or before October 21, 1942, is exercisable only in
conjunction with another person, it is not a general power of appointment.
If the power is created after October 21, 1942, it is not a general power
of appointment if it is exercisable only in conjunction with the creator of
the power. If the power is exercisable only in conjunction with a person
who has a substantial interest in the property subject to the power that
is adverse to exercise in the decedent's favor, the power is not a general
power of appointment. Finally, if after the two exceptions just mentioned
are taken into account the power is a general one but exercisable in favor
of the other powerholder it is considered a general power in the decedent only to the extent of the decedent's aliquot portion of the property subject
to the power. In other words, the powerholders are assumed to agree to
divide the appointive property among themselves.
The operation of these provisions are well illustrated by the applicable
Treasury Regulations.63 On the whole, the deliberate creation of joint
powers does not seem to be a popular planning technique. If we recall
that the usual goal is to give a beneficiary access to property 'without
giving the 'beneficiary a general power of appointment that will result in
transfer tax consequences, the disadvantages of the jointly held power
are evident. The price of the exception is an adverse interest in the other
powerholder. In other words, the cooperation of that other powerholder
is necessary to allow the beneficiary access to the appointive property.
Attitudes can change and no matter how cooperative the other powerholder (and that powerholder must be a person=-corporations, including
corporate fiduciaries, are not considered to have adverse interests) may
be when the power is created, a change of heart can completely derail
the best laid plans. The exceptions based on ascertainable standards and
the five and five power depend only on the skill of the draftsperson.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the power of appointment is an important tool for meeting
clients' needs for flexible estate plans. The transfer tax principles involved
in its use are fairly well settled and really quite favorable to accomplishing
many commonestate planning goals.
·
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